Europe is armed, even if it has so far put flowers in its cannons. It has 515 nuclear warheads (290 French and 225 British) capable of striking at a distance of up to 8,000 kilometers (Moscow has 5,000). It also has satellites, rockets, drones, bombers and fighters, aircraft carriers, frigates, submarines, tanks, artillery, mines, and well-trained men. The pilots have more flying hours (more than double) and better training than the Russians, and in a dogfight they would win: we are no longer in the days of the Red Baron and far beyond those of "Top Gun", but it is still man who drives the machine. Without the 84,000 American troops stationed in Europe, the European countries, including Great Britain, have about 1,400,000 troops at their disposal, more than the Russians, even if not all of them can be mobilized quickly. In the event of an invasion, will Europe be able to repel it without the intervention of the United States? On paper, yes, but to defeat Russia it needs four ingredients that are missing: a unified command, a comprehensive and effective information system at all levels, an anti-missile defense system like Israel's Iron Dome, and an industrial chain that combines competition and convergence. The White Paper presented by Ursula von der Leyen is full of good intentions, but it's still a glass half empty. Even the 800 billion euros to be spent seem like hanging cheese. Mario Draghi's reintroduction of the common debt is a flatus vocis. So we can't do without NATO. It's not true that we don't have time, we have all the time necessary to form a real European defense; on the contrary, we need quick answers. Neither the extreme right nor the extreme left like ReArm, but it's about rearmament, this time the name doesn't hide it. Scenarios are already circulating that are as worrying as they are realistic. A defeat in Ukraine or a fake peace deal between Trump and Putin could set off a chain reaction, writes Mike Kimmage, director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, one of the most important think tanks on international politics, in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs. The war game is already clear. Poland and the Baltic states, feeling directly threatened, are demanding the activation of NATO's Article 5. If the U.S. refuses, the countries on the front line will be forced to intervene militarily. The European governments that supported Ukraine can't stay out, starting with the United Kingdom, which signed a 100-year aid pact. At that point, either Trump will lose face and the U.S. will lose honor, or the American president will be forced to back down. Putin's promises are written in steppe mud. Immediately after the Munich Agreement, Adolf Hitler swore that he was only interested in protecting the Sudeten Germans and that he would never, ever invade Czechoslovakia. France and England believed him; we know how that turned out. "Just as Putin cannot afford to lose the war in Ukraine, Trump cannot afford to lose Europe," Kimmage argues. Let's hope he's right. Mad Vlad is playing cat and mouse with The Donald, and the stakes go beyond Ukraine.
Europe without America? If the United States turns off the lights, we'll keep working
Italy, together with Great Britain and Japan, is working on the construction of a sixth-generation fighter plane that will surpass the American F-35 and the Russian Sukhoi Su-57 or T-50. This is not just about hypotheticals or war games. Christophe Gomart, former head of French military intelligence and now an EPP MEP, has sounded a very real alarm: "If the U.S. were to attack Greenland, no European country would be able to send its F-35s to defend it because these jets are equipped with a blocking system that would prevent them from flying unless the flight plan was approved by the Pentagon." Donald Trump's allies feel like subjects and want to emancipate themselves. France is working with Germany and Spain on the superplane of the near future. Gomart has highlighted the dilemmas and defense projects in the era of America First. And they also reveal the other side of the moon: on the one hand, two planes that are, all things considered, similar, one Anglo-Italian-Japanese and one French, each costing billions of euros that fall on the taxpayers of four national budgets; on the other hand, instead, a single flying machine, a single budget and the richest taxpayers in the world. This is the thread that leads us on our tortuous journey through the labyrinth of the waged war, which today is no longer a war game. A dark war also because the friends of the past can even become new enemies. Those who say "yes to the common defense, no to national rearmament" are right in theory, but in the meantime, unfortunately, we can't ignore rearmament until there is (if there ever is) a United States of Europe. An army of the Old Continent, without Americans, can only be composed of national contingents, just like the Atlantic Alliance, which has no armies, but 18,000 officers at all levels and from all member countries; What unites them is a clear chain of command and, above all, the definition of the common enemy, of the objective to be achieved, of the strategy to be adopted, in short, the "politics by other means" of General Carl von Clausewitz, whose teachings the Russians and the Ukrainians, both great-grandchildren of Lenin, have drunk, the former with their wasteful offensive war and the latter with an effective defensive war.
The new strategic doctrine
The invasion of Ukraine came as a shock even to the military high command. After the end of the Cold War, any manual of good military practice would have stated that ground combat with men sent to their deaths, tanks, guns, ambushes, sieges, carpet bombing, the destruction of cities, in short, as in the Second World War, was a thing of the past. Take battle tanks: it was believed that there was no longer any need for them, and production was stopped, at least until the Russian annexation of Crimea awoke the military elites from their long sleep, while the politicians continued to sleep and deceive their electorates. Today, Donald Trump mocks Europe and NATO because they don't have offensive military forces. But who wanted that if not the United States? Those who did military service in Europe, even at a low level, were indoctrinated with a very simple principle: in the event of a Soviet attack (at that time the USSR was still aggressive and preparing to invade Afghanistan), one must resist for a few hours until the NATO counteroffensive began and the warheads hidden in the belly of the Alps were armed. Italy, a defeated country, could do nothing else. But the same was true for West Germany, which was even more exposed because it was divided by the Warsaw Pact with a real Iron Curtain. Well, all this no longer applies, so the strategists with stars and stripes went back to writing manuals, and even the Americans had to revise their doctrine based on asymmetric conflicts. After all, after their defeat in Vietnam, they only had to flex their muscles in Grenada (a small Caribbean island), Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (twice), countries that certainly weren't military powers, and yet Uncle Sam suffered resounding defeats.
On September 11, 2001, with the attack on the Twin Towers (successful) and the White House (failed), the United States discovered that it was neither invulnerable nor safe between two great oceans (whatever Trump may say), but its enemy was obscure, hidden in the desert sands or in the Casbah, no longer in Moscow and not yet in Beijing. Therefore, the art of war must be revised, partly by looking at history, partly by imagining the future realistically and without illusions. Even those who want a universal cosmopolitan peace need to take a reality check. Where do we start? With what we have.
One command, many armies
The European Union is certainly not short of documents, acronyms and abbreviations. The ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) was born with a solemn declaration in 2002 and gradually generated the strategic compass that intersects with NATO's Strategic Concept, both in 2022 after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the most serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. The EU has its own military apparatus and summits, but the doctrine is that European defense is complementary to that of the Atlantic Alliance. Madeline Albright, then Secretary of State under Bill Clinton (between 1997 and 2001), came up with the principle of the "three Ds". The first is discrimination, in the sense that any behavior by a country or group of countries that is not shared by the other allies must be avoided. The second D is duplication of commands and structures. The third, decoupling, refers to the strategic autonomy of a European army. This is the knot that needs to be untied today in order to defend Ukraine and the whole of Europe, because strategic priorities no longer coincide since Trump has been in the White House. It is not even true that the EU needs unanimity to move forward. The Lisbon Treaty provides for enhanced cooperation. Moreover, a union of concentric circles already exists, and the euro area can be flanked by a defense area even more open than the monetary one; nine countries say they are ready, starting with France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. Europe, that is all the countries united under the banner of the Union, must be able to defend itself and face the threats that may appear on its doorstep: a responsibility that can no longer be delegated to others. Today, the NATO summit is composed of an Italian, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, who presides over the military committee, an American, who, as always, is the supreme commander, General Christopher Cavoli, and a Frenchman as his deputy, Admiral Pierre Vandier. In the case of a European command, rotation will be necessary, as it is at the top of the EU. According to those who have worked in NATO commands, there is no shortage of disagreements and tensions between officers with many stars, but the diatribes have always been more political than military. The armies of European countries have already conducted their own operations, alone or with others, especially in Africa, the Middle East or the Balkans (France and Italy in Mali come to mind), and the armed forces of the various states are by no means unprepared. The five big players in European defense (the E5 group, in Brussels jargon) are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Poland.
The return of the conscripts
A hypothetical Baltic war following a Russian invasion would require 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles, 700 artillery pieces, one million 155-millimeter shells for the first three months, and 2,000 long-range drones per day, more than the French, British, Italian, and German forces combined. Another 300,000 troops would be needed, according to the report by the Brugel Think Tank and the Kiehl Institute, especially if Washington withdraws its troops. The report's co-author, Alexandr Burilkov, told Euronews that these would be recruited in part through "compulsory conscription and supported by large and well-trained reserves," similar to the American National Guard.
It won't be easy; the aging of the population has also aged the armies, and conscription doesn't attract young people. Germany has enormous problems, and Italy is not far behind. All this talk of peace can change in the heat of danger, as Ukraine teaches us. The illusion of universal peace, or at least peace in a "flat" post-Cold War world, has accelerated the partial dismantling of armies and the end of conscription. Things are better in the Scandinavian countries, where there is mostly permanent training and where Russian invasion is a constant danger, as in Finland, Poland, the Czech Republic, the countries with the largest armies, especially in relation to the population. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies stresses that European militaries are under stress. The shortage of personnel at all levels threatens to prevent normal administration, let alone emergency situations. The armies are preparing, but in many cases it will be necessary to reintroduce conscription. And it's not just a question of quantity, but also of preparation and morale, the human factors that are always fundamental and today more than ever.
Butter and cannons
An increase in defense capabilities is destined to absorb enormous public and private resources. A change has already taken place in the last two years: in 2024, spending by European NATO countries has increased and is now 50% higher than in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and alarm bells rang that the United States and the European Union did not want to hear. Today, according to the London Institute, the Old Continent has become the driving force behind the growth in defense spending. Who pays? Debt is a serious problem, it is also a problem for the United States (its high level of indebtedness to the rest of the world was a consequence of its hegemonic role, today it is an Achilles' heel), not to mention countries like France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, Malta, etc. ... One could say that the debt is greater than the Russian heel. Every war has been fought on the basis of debt, either because we think we shouldn't fight to defend our values, or because we should rack our brains to figure out how to pay for peace. Meanwhile, it's not just a question of spending; defense is an economic and industrial driver, it can give a boost to stagnant production and help sectors in crisis, such as the automobile industry. In Germany, there is talk of converting a Volkswagen plant for defense purposes. The same could happen in Italy with the Stellantis factories, which will not be saturated even with the return of the internal combustion engine. Research and development now accounts for a third of total defense spending, up from 15 percent a decade ago. But we are only filling the hole left by the cuts since 2009. Much more needs to be done. There are countries like Germany that can spend without creating inflation and without compromising the welfare state. But national budgets and the meager EU budget are not enough. Mario Draghi has revived the idea of issuing European bonds to be placed on a financial market that is still huge and looking for profitable investments. Ukraine is also a dramatic financial test case. The EU, together with the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, has provided 134 billion euros, more than the United States (119 billion euros), 49 billion went to the Ukrainian armed forces (but the commitments made amount to 72.2 billion); Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign and security policy chief, has asked for another 40 billion from "willing" countries.
The new military-industrial complex
The European defense industry is neither small nor backward, but above all it is fragmented and divided along national lines. In the ranking of the main groups, BAE Systems (formerly British Aerospace) ranks first, sixth in the world after the American Big Five (Lockheed Martin, RTX, Northrop, Boeing, General Dynamics), with a turnover about half that of Lockheed. Then there are three Chinese companies.
Leonardo (Italian), thirteenth in the world, leads the EU patrol, followed by Airbus (Franco-German-Spanish), Thales (French), Rheinmetall (German), Dassault (French), Naval and Safran (also French), Saab (Swedish), KNDS (Dutch) and Fincantieri (Italian). Italy also has a key position because Leonardo has formed joint ventures and collaborations that extend as far as the United States, where it owns Drs (information technology). To create a continental system, it is necessary to promote "industrial synergies by concentrating developments on common military platforms (aircraft, ships, land vehicles, satellites)," according to Draghi. European countries are still too dependent on the United States for important aspects of their military capabilities: anti-aircraft artillery, missiles, air cover, intelligence. Although they have invested heavily since 2022 to close the gap: 52% of these combat systems are now supplied by European companies, only 34% by American companies, which have concentrated on vehicles, long-range surface-to-air missiles, intelligence, surveillance, aircraft and guided missiles. The British are even talking about excluding the Americans from Five Eyes, the Western surveillance system that also includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand, but the retaliation is purely emotional. On the contrary, European access must be guaranteed on an equal footing; despite Trump, the US is a "fellow human being who makes mistakes". Draghi recalled that between 2020 and 2024, the United States will supply two-thirds of the defense systems imported by European NATO members. Drones, but also artificial intelligence, data processing, electronic warfare, space and satellites: the old continent's groups are there, but they are playing catch-up. The most sensitive issue is nuclear deterrence. Emmanuel Macron has come out in favor of making the force de frappe available, the British have moved closer to the EU but remain on the outside. Here, too, there is a need to unite without knowing how.
Heaven, earth and sea
Europe has a long way to go to ensure its security. There are several satellite systems, most notably those of Eutelsat (which acquired OneWeb in 2022) and SES, which is acquiring Intelsat. They are mostly based on reliable geostationary satellites, but they travel at 36,000 kilometers and have a higher latency compared to low-orbit satellites (400 kilometers) like Starlink: the signal arrives after a third of a second, which can be an eternity in combat. The EU has launched the IRIS 2 program, which will not be operational until around 2030. In addition to Eutelsat and SES, Airbus Defense & Space, Thales Alenia Space, Telespazio, Hispasat and Hisdesat are also competing. Although it has the technology, such as the Franco-Italian Samp T, which is as good as the Patriot, Europe doesn't have adequate protection against missile attacks. We've already mentioned the pointless competition for the sixth-generation fighter-bomber. Today, the F-35 (American, even if European industries contribute to its production for about a third) is the most effective aircraft, superior to the French Rafale and the Eurofighter (Anglo-Italian-German). Russia has always focused on submarine warfare, where Germany once excelled. Europe has some excellent submarines, such as the British Vanguard armed with ballistic missiles, but only 4 nuclear submarines compared to Russia's 11. Fincantieri, after a long period of cooperation with Germany, is now involved in the construction of the fourth new-generation submarine. Italy's real specialty (shared with France) is in multi-mission frigates, the real protagonists of surface combat. This is an example of virtuous cooperation as in missiles, in the production of chips with STM, in electronics where Leonardo is in a triangle with the British BAE and the French Thales. The Italian group has signed an agreement with Rheinmetall for new armored vehicles for the Italian army. Germany has returned to the production of tanks, war machines that had made it famous and now seemed useless.
Cycles and recurrences, let's re-read Giambattista Vico, including his anticipatory intuition on the role of technology and knowledge. At this point, we can only turn the question around: can Europe win without America? Obviously not. But can America win without Europe, or rather, can it win without the Old Continent, to which it has sold not only its products and its debts, but also its culture? This is a rhetorical question for us, and the answer is no, but we'll leave it open for readers attracted by the allure of a new Yalta. Then US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt returned to Washington and said it had been a success, but the real winner was Stalin. History could repeat itself, and not as a farce.
