In the mid-2010s, as the European Union lurched punchdrunk from one crisis to the next, there was one constant. Germany, and in particular Angela Merkel, its chancellor, was the star around which the rest of Europe orbited . Southern European countries choked on the austerity they had to swallow as the price of their bail-outs; easterners wished Mrs Merkel had taken a tougher line on Russia after its annexation of Crimea in 2014.
All had a point. Yet none had any way of working around Germany. Visit Brussels now, however, and all you hear is stories of German ineptitude. The dysfunction of Olaf Scholz's threeparty coalition is spilling over into Europe, complicating dayto-day business as Germany's governing parties bicker and feud. Old alliances are being reshaped as Germany's friends work around it.
As chancellor, Mr Scholz appears to have no aptitude for Mrs Merkel's patient approach to dealmaking. At summits of EU leaders he states the German position and appears surprised when others fail to fall into line. Dashed expectations of German leadership are neither new nor easily overcome. Coalitions, courts and the country's federal structure make decision-making cumbersome. Sometimes, things do work. The Zeitenwende was a genuine change to Germany's foreign and security policy set out by Mr Scholz in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Germany is finally upgrading its armed forces and sending arms to Ukraine, and has transformed its energy policy. Yet Germany's 12 Leaders partners more often remain disappointed. If so, that is because they take Mr Scholz at his word when he says, as he did upon taking office in 2021, that Germany has a "special responsibility" for Europe (see Europe section). This is truer than ever when leadership is lacking elsewhere. France, Germany's traditional if sometimes wayward partner, is paralysed after Emmanuel Macron's ill-advised decision to hold early parliamentary elections last month. Other leaders matter on particular issues, but none can match Germany's overall heft.
And, without energetic German support, several items on the Eu's to-do list now risk slipping into limbo. The first, enlarging the EU to Ukraine and other places, has been identified by Mr Scholz as a priority for a "geopolitical Europe". Yet to prevent the process getting bogged down in bureaucracy, Germany must take the fight to other, more sceptical governments.
The EU will also have to reform itself as it prepares to grow, for instance by altering its expensive agricultural policies and cutting back national veto rights. Completing the capital-markets union, a worthy-but-import ant project that should boost private investment in Europe, and the Eu's The Economist July 27th 2024 coming discussion over whether its internal-market and stateaid rules are up to scratch amid rising us-China tensions, will also make large demands of Germany.
The good news is that the chancellor has decent instincts on these issues. He also has a useful ally in Ursula von der Leyen, who has become one of the most powerful presidents of the European Commission for decades. As a former German cabinet minister, Mrs von der Leyen has antennae finely tuned to the sensitivities of her homeland, even if she hails from a party now in opposition there. Having secured a second fiveyear term last week, she will have political capital to spend.
The bad news is that time is tight. All three of Germany's ruling parties took a pasting in last month's European elections, and are bracing for another in state elections in September. As attention turns to Germany's next national election, due in autumn 2025, the parties will be tempted to take their feet off the accelerator in Europe and play up their differences at home. With geopo litical risks growing and Europe's economy stagnating, that would be short-sighted and dangerou s. Mr Scholz, and Germany, need to step up.
