The EPP is waiting for the vote in Germany and the subsequent formation of a government to see how to proceed. The Stockholm Declaration only talks about security and other agreeable issues, without any reference to green policies or immigration. Not to mention economic policy. Yesterday, during the vote in Strasbourg on the annual report on the ECB, an issue came to the fore that is common to almost all political parties (S&D, Renew, EPP, ECR, etc.), namely the differences between frugal and pro-European states on EU economic policy. In fact, even in the EPP, some MEPs abstained on amendments proposed by the Left, which rightly pointed out the dysfunctionality of a system that has a common monetary policy without a common fiscal and industrial policy, and also criticized the ECB for its too rigid interest rate policy.

The date to mark on the calendar to understand how the European balance of power that governs the Parliament and the Commission in Brussels is destined to change is February 23. Exactly twelve days from now, Germany will hold elections, the results of which will have a major impact on EU policy. Not only because it's by far the most populous country in the Union, but also because the EPP - with 188 members by far the largest group in the European Parliament - is notoriously German-oriented. In short, if - as the polls suggest - the most likely scenario in Berlin is a grand coalition government between the CDU/CSU and the SPD (perhaps expanded to include the FDP liberals and the Greens), this is likely to have repercussions in Brussels, at least in the immediate future. It would inevitably reduce the room for maneuver that the EPP, the conservatives of the ECR and, in recent months, the sovereigntists of the Patriots (the so-called "Venezuela majority") have repeatedly found over the past year on crucial dossiers such as immigration, the Green Deal and the automotive industry.

It is no coincidence that the issue was discussed last week at the meeting of the EPP presidency (Manfred Weber and his deputies, as well as the heads of delegations) in Stockholm. While the Italian (led by Antonio Tajani, who just yesterday announced his intention to run for the vice-presidency again at the Valencia congress at the end of April), Spanish, Croatian and Greek members are pushing to the right, a large part of the German delegation, the Swedes and other Nordic countries are more inclined to look to the center, preserving the so-called "Ursula majority". So it's not surprising that the meeting in the Swedish capital resulted in a document (the Stockholm Declaration) that focuses heavily on security, combating violence against women and children, fighting terrorism, protecting IT infrastructures and guarding against foreign interference. All central issues, of course. But on which there is also broad agreement, unlike other dossiers such as immigration and the environment (whose fate is not independent of the political balance in Germany, where Audi, BMW, Mercedes, Opel and Volkswagen are based).

In short, the German elections will determine the course of the EPP for years to come. With an eye also on Washington, because tensions over tariffs and the relationship with Donald Trump risk becoming a critical element in the relationship between the EPP and the ECR (the party of which Giorgia Meloni was president until last December). At the moment, the ECR seems to be waiting on the sidelines to understand what the impact will be on the rules in the Parliament. Will the EPP continue to be at the disposal of the "Venezuelan majority" on some specific fronts (starting with migrants and green issues, which are not even mentioned in the Stockholm Declaration), or will it - thanks to the coalition with the SPD in Berlin - also look to the center on these issues? The answer will only be known in a few months when the new German government is formed. Only then will we understand in which direction the political balance in Brussels is shifting.

A strengthening of the "Ursula majority" could bring the ECR and the Patriots closer together (together they have 162 MEPs, 26 less than the EPP but 26 more than the S&D). Moreover, the conservatives and the sovereigntists speak to a largely overlapping electorate, minus the never-voiced tones of the former. With one major difference: their position on Ukraine. If this obstacle were removed - if, for example, Moscow and Kiev were to actually begin negotiations - there's no reason why the two groups couldn't coordinate their efforts on a permanent basis. Except, of course, for the far right of the ESN, which includes Germany's AfD.