Major events, such as a war, can evolve in unexpected directions. They, in fact, depend not only on the underlying historical processes, but also on the choices that are made by leaders who matter. Leaders are those who maintain a consistent position in difficulties so that they are not affected by the climate around them. According to this criterion, how should we evaluate the behavior of leaders who matter in the course of the war in Ukraine? On the Western side, leaders who have remained consistent in danger are easy to identify. 

One is Zelensky, whose decision to remain in Kiev after Feb. 24, 2022, and to organize the national resistance prevented Putin from occupying the country and changing its political regime. Another is Biden, the U.S. president, whose decision to side with the Ukrainians by reviving the role of NATO has made it possible to preserve the political border between Europe and Putin's Russia. Another is Giorgia Meloni, who since her opposition days has stood up for Ukraine without ever changing her mind. And in government, she has held the line together with her trusted Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani without wavering. These leaders have had more powerful internal opponents than the external enemy, nevertheless their position has remained consistent throughout the course of the war. The same cannot be said of the major European leaders. Olaf Scholz, German Chancellor, after two and a half years of the war, has not yet expressed an interpretation of what is happening. He has helped Ukraine, transferring financial and military resources, but has done so quietly (and with conditions regarding weapons), out of fear of provoking Russia (as if it needed additional alibis to feel provoked).

Olaf Scholz acted like the CEO of a union-industrial consortium committed to rebuilding the growth model that had made Germany great in the post-Cold War era. The EU's greatest economic power is without a foreign policy. Despite two ongoing wars, Germany continues to be governed according to a mercantile logic. The same cannot be said for French President Emmanuel Macron, who nevertheless lacks other inconsistencies. In his April 25 speech and then in his conversation with the Economist the following May 4, the French president advanced the proposal of a Europe-power with which France could share its nuclear deterrence. A proposal, moreover, that Marine Le Pen immediately criticized, arguing that "French deterrence must remain in the hands of the French. Macron's is a revolutionary proposal that, if properly implemented, could start the process of building a European defense. But then, Macron presents European defense as an alternative to NATO's American-led defense, a proposal that is bound to alienate him from the support of much of the Atlanticist countries of Eastern and Southern Europe. Macron has a concern that few have in Europe, that of not making the latter "vassal" to America. Despite his revolutionary proposals, Macron continues to pursue an autonomous and unilateral French foreign policy. France is the only country (among those in the EU) that sent its own ambassador to the farce of a ceremony to celebrate Vladimir Putin's fifth term as president of the Russian Federation. With the company of Serbia and Hungary, it is the only country (among those in the EU) that a few days ago welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping, who came to Europe to criticize NATO and divide the EU, rather than to help find a peace settlement in Ukraine. Macron, who is the head of a mid-country, thinks he is leading a great power, which cheers the French establishment but not the leaders of the other EU member states. In short, the EU would need leaders capable of stretching its vision. This time, given how they behave, it cannot be the Franco-German axis that will show the way.