During the election campaign, Ursula von der Leyen said she was ready to cooperate with anyone who was in favor of Europe, the rule of law and Ukraine. The first commitment was essentially to exclude Eurosceptic forces. After Ursula's re-election, it is appropriate to reflect more deeply on the meaning of the term "pro-Europe". Having been elected by a majority, the newly elected President is in fact wearing a double hat: on the one hand, that of the head of the institution that is supposed to protect the general interest of the Union (the Commission) and, on the other hand, that of a political leader committed to implementing an agenda in line with the orientations of the parties that elected her. In a sense, this is the same duality that characterizes the position of national leaders. In Brussels, however, there is a danger of a short-circuit, so that to be "anti-Ursula" is ipso facto to be "anti-European". The misunderstanding is understandable, since in the past groups outside the majority wanted to dismantle the Union and were in opposition even at the national level. But the situation has gradually changed. The idea of leaving the EU has been shelved by many; the goal now is to transform the Union from within. Many parties that started out as anti-EU are now leading or participating in their countries' governments. Five governments belonging - directly or indirectly - to the conservative group (Italy, Finland, Czech Republic, Sweden, and recently Belgium) currently sit on the Council, while four others are linked to the patriot group (Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, and recently the Netherlands). The "cordon sanitaire" criterion used in Parliament to elect Lady Ursula cannot be maintained in the Council. The nine governments include parties that are part of the pro-Ursula majority in Brussels. The EU's most important institution cannot be polarized into two opposing blocs. The ideological and political development of the Eurosceptic galaxy opens spaces for the search for a broad consensus on the political "fundamentals" of the Union. This would be a process similar to what happened in many nation-states in the second half of the twentieth century, with the gradual "normalization" of anti-system parties. What could be the political foundations on which to converge? The most obvious and elementary seems to have been largely acquired: accepting the existence of the EU and not opposing (indeed, favoring) its survival. At least three important implications follow from this initial selection of areas where there are signs of readiness. The first concerns external borders. In the new geopolitical context, territorial control is an indispensable condition for the Union's resilience, especially in the areas of immigration and defense. We know that there are strong party differences on both. But on the need for a clearer and more effective external demarcation of the Union, it is possible to build cross-party convergence in principle, so as to shift the discussion from if to how. It is legitimate to have different ideas about whether an EU army should be created. But if one accepts that the Union must defend itself against any external aggression, then one cannot deny it the availability of its own deterrent, even a composite one, which would guarantee the security of each and every member state. The second implication concerns "sharing" between countries. The deepening interdependence of European value chains and European societies requires the establishment of permanent mechanisms of solidarity and joint investment, especially in emergency situations (as in the case of the pandemic). Building a broad consensus would be facilitated by changing perceptions. Financial sharing mechanisms should be presented as forms of "re-insurance" (the Union as a second-tier insurance against systemic risks that affect everyone through no "fault of their own") rather than as redistribution between rich and poor countries. The third and most sensitive implication concerns the introduction of more efficient decision-making procedures.

This is difficult to discuss with patriots. But it is possible to open a dialogue with conservatives. During the election campaign, their mantra was to transform the EU from a bureaucratic into a political giant. How can this be done without a control room capable of making and implementing democratic and collective decisions quickly? It is to be hoped that the experience of government will make the parties of the ECR Group more aware of this. The Union is still caught between existential fragility and contingent resistance. Overcoming the stranglehold requires breaking through the cordons sanitaire and promoting conversion to the common good.